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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
GUSTAVO MORA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20020095-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea to 
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-302 
(1999). This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
(1999 & Supp. 2001) (pour over provision). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
where the plea-taking court's involved dialogue with defendant elicited his undisputed 
understanding of the plea agreement's terms and consequences? 
"A 'withdrawal of a plea of guilty is a privilege, not a right... [and] is within the 
sound discretion of the trial court.'" State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f 9, 1 P.3d 1108 
(quoting State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Utah 1987)). Thus, the reviewing court 
"will not disturb the trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea unless it 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
f 
clearly appears that the trial court has exceeded its permitted range of discretion." Id, 
(citation omitted). Additionally, "[t]he trial court's findings of fact made in conjunction 
i 
with its decision will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous." Id. (quotation 
omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION, STATUTES, AND RULES { 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6(2) (1999 & Supp. 2002): 
A plea of guilty may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with
 ( 
leave of the court. 
UTAH R.CRIM. P. 11(e): 
The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and < 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:... 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made;... 
(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to ( 
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of 
proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an 
admission of all those elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if 
the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be 
imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of 
the imposition of consecutive sentences;... 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if 
used, a sworn statement reciting these factors after the court has established that 
2 
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the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the sworn 
statement 
UTAH R. CRIM. P. 30(a): 
Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the 
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
Defendant was charged with aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation 
of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-302 (1999), and theft, a second degree felony, in violation of 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-404, -412(a)(iii) (1999) (R27-28). Following a preliminary 
hearing on 25 January 2001, defendant was bound over as charged (R54-55). Pursuant to 
a subsequent plea agreement, defendant entered a guilty plea to aggravated robbery and 
the theft charge was dismissed (R56-63) (a copy of the Statement of Defendant, 
Certificate of Counsel, and Order is contained in addendum A) (a copy of the 20 April 
2001, Change of Plea Proceeding (see Rl 26) is contained in addendum B). 
Approximately three weeks later, on 11 May 2001, defendant filed a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea (R67-69). Defendant claimed that the plea-taking court had not 
strictly complied with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, in accepting his guilty 
plea (R86-98). After reviewing the plea colloquy and defendant's plea affidavit, the trial 
court found "that all requirements of [r]ule 11 have been complied with" and that 
defendant had thus failed to establish "good cause" to withdraw his guilty plea 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
( 
(R127:22).1 The trial court's extensive written findings are reproduced here with 
supporting citation to the record: 
1. On October 11, 2000, Mitra Baral was robbed at gunpoint at the 
Econolodge located at 715 West North Temple. (See R28). 
3. The Econolodge surveillance tape captured the defendant on the 
video during the robbery. Mitra Baral gave the Salt Lake County 
Police Department the videotape. (See R29). 
4. Mitra Baral later identified the defendant in a photo-lineup as the man who 
robbed him. (SeeR2S). 
5. Salt Lake City Police Detective G. Allred also identified the defendant in 
the Econolodge surveillance video from a still photo. (See R29). 
6. Defendant was ultimately charged with. . . [aggravated [rjobbery, a [fjirst 
[d]egree [fjelony, and [t]heft [], a [s]econd [d]egree [fjelony for the incident 
that occurred at the Econolodge on October 11,2000. Defendant was 
notified that the State was seeking an enhanced penalty because a firearm 
had been used during commission of the robbery. (See R27-28). 
7. Defendant was also charged with two other [aggravated [jobberies, 
arising out of incidents unrelated to the October 11,2000 Econolodge 
robbery. (SeeR6\). 
8. Following [preliminary [h]earings held in each case, defendant was bound 
over to stand trial on all three of his [aggravated [r]obbery cases. (See, 
e.g,R55). 
9. Defendant was, at the time of his arrest, a parole fugitive from California. 
The State of California had communicated that it wished to prosecute the 
defendant under its habitual offender or "three strikes" statute (See R126:6, 
add.B.) 
defendant's motion to withdraw was heard by a different judge; accordingly, the 
State's brief distinguishes the plea-taking court from the motion to withdraw or trial 
court. 
4 
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10. The instant case was scheduled for trial on May 3, 4, and 8, 2001. A final 
pre-trial conference was held on 20 April, 2001. 
11. Prior to the final pre-trial conference, the State of Utah extended a plea 
bargain offer. The offer was that defendant could enter a guilty plea to an 
[aggravated [r]obbery, a [fjirst [d]egree [fjelony, including the weapon 
enhancement. In exchange, the remaining charge (a theft from a person) in 
the instant case would be dismissed, as would defendant's other two 
[aggravated [r]obbery cases. (See R 126:4-5, add. B). 
12. The defendant appeared at the pre-trial conference before Judge David S. 
Young on April 20, 2001, and indicated a willingness to accept the State's 
plea bargain offer. The Court then began the process of explaining to 
defendant the rights he waived in entering a guilty plea. (Id.). 
13. Defendant repeatedly interrupted Judge Young during the plea colloquy, 
and insisted that he be permitted to plead guilty and be sent to prison that 
very same day. (See, e.g., R126:7-13, 15-20, add. B). 
14. David Biggs, defendant's attorney, referred to a document, which he had 
filled out and reviewed with the defendant prior to the colloquy with the 
Court. That document, entitled Statement of Defendant, Certificate of 
Counsel and Order, was also referred to by Judge Young and is part of the 
record in the instant case. (See Rl26:20,23-24, add. B\ (see also R61-62, 
add. A). 
15. At one point during the colloquy, Judge Young questioned the defendant's 
willingness to plead guilty, and indicated that perhaps the cases should go 
to trial. (See R126:7-13, 15-20, add. B). 
16. The State's representative, who was also present at the pre-trial conference, 
indicated that the State was prepared to go forward with trial on May 3. 
(SeeR\26:\\,add. B) 
17. Defendant indicated that he wanted to plead guilty, but insisted on being 
sentenced to prison that day. (See R126:11-12-13, add. B). 
18. The Court ultimately accommodated the defendant's desire to have 
sentence imposed immediately after being assured by a representative of 
5 
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< 
Adult Probation and Parole that a post-sentence report could be completed 
in lieu of a pre-sentence report. {See R126:13-20, add. B) 
19. The defendant then informed the Court, "I want to take it" {See R 126:13, ( 
2Q,add.B). 
20. During the plea colloquy, the defendant admitted that he took personal 
property from the victim and that he got the victim to give him the money 
by possessing a gun. The defendant acknowledged that conduct and 
indicated, "I plead guilty to that." {See R126:20, add. B). 
21. The defendant was advised, both orally and as part of the Statement of 
Defendant that he had a right to have a trial by an impartial jury on all his
 { 
cases, and was in fact reminded that one of his cases was set for trial 
beginning on May 3. The Statement of Defendant, which defendant 
executed in open court, included that the defendant's right to trial included 
the right to a speedy, public trial. {See R126:22,24, add. B\ {see also R58, 
add. A). « 
22. Defendant was also advised both orally and as part of the Statement of 
Defendant that before he could be convicted, the jury would have to 
unanimously agree. As part of the Statement of Defendant defendant 
acknowledged an understanding of the concept of reasonable doubt and that 
the State bears the burden of proving guilt to that high standard. {See 
R126:22, add. 5), {see also R59, add. A). 
23. Defendant was advised both orally and as part of the Statement of 
Defendant that the State would be required to call witnesses in an effort to 
convict him, and that he had the right to cross examine those witnesses with 
the assistance of his attorney. {See R126:22, add. 5), {see also R58, add. 
A). 
- & • • . ' 
24. Defendant was advised both orally and as part of the Statement of 
Defendant that he had the right to compel witnesses to testify on his behalf. 
The Statement of Defendant further indicated that if the defendant could 
not afford to subpoena witnesses, the State would bear the cost of 
subpoena. {Id.) 
25. Defendant was advised both orally and as part of the Statement of 
Defendant that at trial, he had the right to testify on his own behalf, but he 
6 
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also had the right to remain silent. He was advised both orally and as part 
of the Statement of Defendant that if he exercised his right to remain silent, 
no presumption as to his guilt could be drawn by his silence. (Id.) 
26. Defendant was advised both orally and as part of the Statement of 
Defendant as to the penalty for [aggravated [rjobbery, a [fjirst [d]egree 
[f]elony, and as to the effect of the weapons enhancement to which he also 
entered a guilty plea. The defendant acknowledged several times that he 
understood the penalty for both the offense and the enhancement. (See 
R126:19-23, add. B)9 (see also R56, 59, add. A). 
27. Defendant was advised both orally and as part of the Statement of 
Defendant that by pleading guilty he waived his rights associated with 
appeal, the trial court indicating, "the appeals court can't review a trial that 
doesn't happen." Defendant acknowledged the waiver by stating, "I know 
that" (See R126:23, add. B\ (see also R59, add. A). 
28. Defendant was advised, both orally and as part of the Statement of 
Defendant, that he had 30 days from the date of entry of the plea (which 
was the same day defendant was sentenced) to withdraw his plea for good 
cause shown. (See R126:23, add. B\ (see also R60, add. A). 
29. Defendant was asked whether he was satisfied with the advice his attorney 
had given him. He indicated that he was indeed satisfied. (SeeR126:23, 
add. B)9 (see also R60, add. A). 
30. Defendant was asked whether he had any questions of the Court or counsel. 
He indicated he had no questions. (Id.) 
31. Defendant and the Court engaged in extensive discussion about the fact that 
he anticipated being extradited to and prosecuted in the State of California. 
Both his attorney David Biggs and the Court advised the defendant that no 
one could guarantee him what the State of California was going to do with 
him. (See R126:6-7, add. B). 
32. Defendant was advised that he could be required to serve time in California 
after he was finished serving hit time in Utah. The Statement of Defendant 
also addressed the concept of concurrent as opposed to consecutive 
sentences. (See R126:6-7, add. #), (see also R59, add. A). 
7 
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Defendant was also advised that the Court could not assure him that he 
would not be prosecuted federally on gun charges. (See R126:7, add, B). 
Defendant participated in all phases of the colloquy. He asked questions 
and was responsive to questions asked of him. He repeatedly indicated that 
he understood the plea bargain, the various rights he was waiving by 
entering it, and the penalty involved. (See, e.g., R 126:15-24, at/J. B). 
Defendant acknowledged as part of the Statement of Defendant that he 
could read and understand English, that he had read the Statement of 
Defendant and acknowledged the truth of its contents, and that he was not 
under the influence of anything that would impair his judgment. He further 
indicated as part of that Statement of Defendant that no undue influence, 
threats, coercion or inducements were brought to bear upon him to cause 
him to enter a guilty plea. (See R60-61, add. A). 
After the colloquy, defendant was unshackled for purposes of signing the 
Statement of Defendant, which he signed in open court. The Court added 
its signature, and asked the defendant how he pled to [aggravated 
[rjobbery, a [fjirst [d]egree felony. The defendant answered, "I plead 
guilty." (See R126:23-24, add. B\ (see also R61-63, add. A). 
In exchange for his guilty plea to [aggravated [rjobbery in case 
001917882, count two in that case and cases 001918102 and 001918169, 
both of which were [aggravated [rjobberies, were dismissed. (See 
R126:24, add. B\ (see also R61, add. A). 
Defendant waived the preparation of a pre-sentence report and the statutory 
minimum time for sentencing, asking to be sentenced immediately. (See 
R126:24, add. B). 
The Court accommodated the defendant's desire, and sentenced him to an 
indeterminate term of 6 years-to-life, plus an additional 0-5 years for the 
discretionary weapon enhancement, to run consecutively to the 6-to-life. 
(See $.126:25, add. B). 
(a complete copy is contained in addendum Q. 
8 
\ 
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Based on the above, the trial court concluded that "[tjaken together," the plea 
colloquy and defendant's plea affidavit showed strict compliance with rule 11 (Rl 18), 
add.C. 
Defendant timely appealed (R120). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The instant plea colloquy shows that the plea-taking court strictly complied with 
rule 11(e) in accepting defendant's guilty plea in all but one respect: The plea-taking 
court did not specifically inform defendant of the State's burden to prove the elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Significantly, defendant essentially concedes that the plea 
affidavit cures this and the other deficiencies of which he complains on appeal. 
Defendant claims, however, that the plea affidavit was not properly incorporated and thus 
cannot be used to demonstrate strict compliance with rule 11. Given the plea-taking 
court's "involved dialogue" with defendant regarding the nature and consequences of his 
guilty plea, defendant's claim lacks merit and should be rejected. The plea affidavit, 
executed in open court, was properly incorporated here. 
Even if the Court determines that the plea affidavit was not properly incorporated, 
any arguable error in failing to specifically ask if defendant had read and understood the 
plea affidavit was harmless and should therefore be disregarded. Defendant has not and 
cannot claim that the arguable error was prejudicial, or that he would have refused the 
plea agreement if the plea-taking court had so inquired. Rather, a review of the instant 
9 
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record demonstrates defendant's undisputed understanding of the consequences of his 
decision to accept the plea agreement, including imposition of the maximum statutory 
i 
. . > . • 
term. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S i 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA BECAUSE THE 
PLEA-TAKING COURT'S INVOLVED DIALOGUE WITH 
DEFENDANT ELICITED HIS UNDISPUTED UNDERSTANDING 
OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT'S TERMS AND CONSEQUENCES 
In Point I of his brief, defendant complains that the plea colloquy failed to strictly 
comply with rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. In Point II of his brief, 
defendant essentially concedes that any deficiency in the plea colloquy may be cured by 
reference to his plea affidavit; however, defendant argues that the plea-taking court did 
not adequately incorporate the plea affidavit because "the court never asked [defendant] < 
if he had read the plea affidavit let alone if he understood it." Aplt. Br. at 8. Defendant 
does not claim, however, that he failed to read or otherwise understand the plea affidavit. 
Id. Indeed, while the plea-taking court did not specifically ask if defendant had read and 
understood the plea affidavit, it is clear from the plea colloquy that defendant in fact 
knew and understood the terms and consequences of the plea agreement. Moreover, both 
defendant and his counsel certified in writing before the plea-taking court that defendant 
had read the plea affidavit (or had it read to him) and that he understood its contents. 
Finally, defendant does not claim that he would have rejected the plea agreement if the 
10 
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plea-taking court had specifically asked if he had read and understood the plea affidavit. 
Given these circumstances, any arguable error was technical or non-prejudicial and does 
not merit reversal. 
A. Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Does Not Equate 
Strict Compliance with Formalistic Ritual. 
Under rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a trial court may not accept a 
guilty plea before making certain findings, most of which involve the defendant's having 
been advised of his constitutional rights. Thus, "'the trial court [must] personally 
establish that the defendant's guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary and establish on 
the record that the defendant knowingly waived his or her constitutional rights.'" State v. 
Visser, 2000 UT 88, f 11,22 P.3d 1242 (quoting State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 995 
(Utah 1993)). 
The Utah Supreme Court has "described this duty as one of strict compliance." Id. 
(quoting State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996)). "Strict compliance, 
however, does not mandate a particular script or rote recitation of the rights listed." Id. 
(citing Abeyta, 852 P.2d at 996; State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 218 (Utah 1991)). On 
the contrary, "the substantive goal of rule 11 is to ensure that defendants know of their 
rights and thereby understand the basic consequences of their decision to plead guilty. 
That goal should not be overshadowed or undermined for formalistic ritual." Id. 
Accordingly, compliance with rule 11 is determined by resort to the record as a 
whole and can be achieved through "multiple means," including the use of a properly 
11 
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incorporated written plea affidavit and the "contents of other documents such as the 
information, presentence reports, exhibits, etc." See Maguire, 830 P.2d at 217-218; State 
v. Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, fl[ 17-18, 996 P.2d 1065, ajf'd 2001 UT 68, 31 P.3d 528; 
State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1160 (Utah App. 1998). 
B. The Instant Plea Colloquy is Adequate to Establish Strict Compliance { 
in All But One Respect—the Plea Court Did Not Specifically State the 
State's Responsibility to Prove Each Element Beyond a Reasonable 
Doubt 
i 
Here, defendant claims that the plea colloquy is inadequate to establish strict 
compliance with rule 11 on several grounds. Specifically, defendant cursorily alleges 
that the plea colloquy was deficient under rule 11(e) because: < 
•the plea-taking court "failed to fully state the elements of aggravated robbery [,]" 
•the plea-taking court "failed to discuss the factual basis for the charge and how 
thai \ to the elements of aggravated robbery," * 
•the plea-taking :ourt failed to inform defendant "that his guilty plea was an 
admission to all of the elements of aggravated robbery [,]" 
•the plea-taking court failed to inform defendant "that his plea to aggravated 
robbery could result in consecutive imposition of a sentence with his 
California chargesf,]" 
•the plea-taking court failed to inquire "whether threats or promises had been ^ 
made to get him to plead guilty; whether he was under the influence of a 
substance that would affect his reasoning; or whether he was suffering from 
a mental impairment that may affect a knowing and voluntary plea to 
aggravated robberyf,]" and 
( 
•the plea-taking court failed to inform defendant "that the State bears the burden of 
proving each element of aggravated robbery beyond a reasonable doubt." 
'• I 
12 
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Aplt. Br. at 5-7. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e) (2), (4)-(5). 
Contrary to defendant's claims, and as will be demonstrated below, the plea 
colloquy record itself establishes the plea court's strict compliance with rule 11 in regard 
to all of the above listed allegations of error with one exception—the plea-taking court 
did not specifically inform defendant during the plea colloquy of the State's burden to 
prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt. 
First, contrary to defendant's suggestion, there is no requirement that the plea-
taking court recite the specific rights outlined in rule 11, let alone the elements of the 
offense or the factual bases during the plea colloquy. Visser, 2000 UT 88, f 11. Rather, 
rule 11 requires only that the plea court make certain findings before accepting the plea. 
Those findings may be based on any evidence before the plea-taking court. Here, 
defense counsel stated the elements and described defendant's conduct or the factual 
bases during the plea colloquy: "Your Honor, I put in [the plea affidavit] the factual 
bases as follows: On October 11th, 2000, in Salt Lake County, I took personal property 
from the victim, and I had-and possessed a gun that got the victim to give me the money" 
(R 126:20), add. B. Defendant immediately responded, "I plead guilty to that" (id.). 
Thus, the plea colloquy record itself establishes that defendant knew and understood the 
elements of aggravated robbery, the factual bases for the charge, and that his plea was an 
admission to all of those elements in strict compliance with rule 11. 
13 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Second, contrary to defendant's assertion, the plea-taking court also orally 
informed him of the possibility that California could impose a sentence consecutive to his 
Utah sentence: 
. . . "[T]here's no way that Utah can control California and no way that 
California can control Utah. They each have independent convictions.... 
California can put a hold on you and they can take you after you served { 
your Utah times. They could also say, okay, he's served six years in Utah, 
we're going to terminate his parole unsuccessful. They could do that. 
(R126:7), add. B. The plea-taking court also cautioned defendant that his insistence on 
being sentenced that day would likely result in his receiving the maximum sentence 
possible, a term of five years-to-life with a mandatory one-year consecutive sentence, and 
an additional discretionary zero-to-five years (R126:13-20), add. B. The plea-taking 
court accordingly emphasized that if accepted, defendant's guilty plea could result in his 
serving 10-years-to-life (R126:18), add. B. Defendant clearly understood and accepted < 
that possibility: 
It ain't really nothing. You know what? I'm going to California, do 25-to-
life. It doesn't matter what you give me. I'm never—I'm never going to ( 
get out from over there, you know That's why it doesn't matter to me if 
I take ten-years-to-life, and I know it, you know, because I really have a lot 
of strikes, you know, and I know I got to go fight more charges over there. 
(id.). " 
Third, the plea-taking court's involved dialogue with defendant also established 
defendant's clear motivation in accepting the plea agreement (see Rl 19), add. C. < 
Throughout the colloquy, defendant adamantly and repeatedly interjected that he was 
. • i 
14 
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accepting the plea agreement only on the condition that he be sentenced that day and 
immediately transferred from jail to prison: 
PLEA COURT: What's the reason that you think it's so important for you to 
go to prison today? 
DEFENDANT: I need—because I don't want—look, I'm from L.A. County 
Jail, you know, I don't like this county jail, you know. I'd 
rather be in prison. I'd rather be in prison 50 years than to be 
in that county jail another day. That's just the way I feel, you 
know. I would rather do 50 years in that prison. That's why I 
was taking a five-to-life. Only for that reason, that I was 
going out to that prison today, not tomorrow, today. That's 
what I thought. That's what he told me. That's why I said 
I'll take the five-to-life. 
(R126:13), add, B. Thus, the plea colloquy established that defendant wanted to plead 
guilty to get out of the county jail and to go immediately to prison. Given defendant's 
undisputed and adamantly expressed motivation for accepting the plea agreement, any 
further inquiry as to any possible threats or promises would have amounted to no more 
than formalistic ritual. Visser, 2000 UT 88, f 11. 
Finally, as noted previously, although the plea court strictly complied with rule 11 
during the plea colloquy with respect to all of the above, the plea court did not expressly 
state that the prosecution must prove the elements of aggravated robbery beyond a 
reasonable doubt Thus, the plea colloquy alone is inadequate to establish strict 
compliance with rule 11(e) here. 
15 
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C. The Record as a Whole Establishes Strict Compliance With Rule 
11(e). 
While the plea colloquy is alone inadequate to establish strict compliance with rule 
11(e), the record as a whole, including the plea affidavit itself, is adequate to establish 
strict compliance. Indeed, defendant aptly concedes that the plea affidavit alone is < 
"sufficient" to establish die elements of aggravated robbery "and the facts that support 
that charge."2 Aplt. Br. at 8. See (R56-57), add. A. Although defendant does not 
expressly concede that the other claimed deficiencies in the plea colloquy are similarly 
cured by his plea affidavit, he does not claim that the plea affidavit is inadequate to 
establish strict compliance with rule 11. Nor could he. Indeed, the plea affidavit { 
establishes all of the other rule 11 elements defendant claims were lacking in the plea 
colloquy, specifically: 
•The State's burden to prove each element of aggravated robbery beyond a 
reasonable doubt is found at (R58), add. A\ 
•That defendant's guilty plea was an admission to all of the elements of < 
aggravated robbery is found at (R56-60), add. A; 
Notwithstanding defendant's apparent concession, his awareness of the elements 
of aggravated robbery charge and the factual bases thereof is further demonstrated in the 
record by his presence at arraignment and a preliminary hearing, which the plea-taking 
court would have been aware of. See Maguire, 830 P.2d at 217-218, n. 1 (strict 
compliance review contemplates review of th* "record as a whole," i.e., the record may ( 
reflect basis for rule 11 findings by multiple means). Having undergone a preliminary 
hearing at which the State had to prove probable cause for each element of the offenses, 
defendant cannot credibly argue that he was unaware of the nature of the charge or the 
factual bases at the time he pled guilty (see R27-29, 54-55). 
16 
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•That defendant's guilty plea could result in consecutive sentences is found at 
(R59), add A, and 
•That defendant entered the plea voluntarily, absent threats, promises, and the 
influence of any substance or mental impairment is found at (R60), add. A. 
See Aplt. Br. at 5-7. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e) (2), (4)(A), (5). Thus, any arguable 
deficiency in the plea colloquy is cured by reference to the plea affidavit. 
D. Defendant Fails to Show Any Clear Error in the Trial 
Court's Finding That the Plea Affidavit, Executed in 
Open Court, Was Properly Incorporated Here. 
Notwithstanding the adequacy of the plea affidavit, defendant claims that it cannot 
be used to establish the plea-taking court's strict compliance with rule 11 because the 
affidavit was not properly incorporated below. Specifically, defendant claims that the 
plea-taking court failed to specifically ask him if he had read and understood the plea 
affidavit during the plea colloquy. Aplt. Br. at 8. Defendant's claim should be rejected. 
As found by the trial court, the entire record shows that defendant was well-
informed regarding the plea agreement and that the plea affidavit, executed in open court, 
is properly part of the record {see Rl 13,119), add. C. Indeed, defendant does not assert 
that he in fact did not read or understand the plea affidavit. Aplt. Br. at 4-8. Nor does 
defendant acknowledge or otherwise challenge the trial court's well-supported ruling. 
See Aplt. Br. at 4-8. Defendant does not argue that the trial court's findings are clearly 
erroneous. Aplt. Br. at 4-8. He therefore foih* to demonstrate that the trial court failed to 
exercise sound discretion in denying his withdrawal motion. His claim can be rejected on 
this ground alone. State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, % 9, 1 P.3d 1108. 
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i 
In any event, the trial court's incorporation ruling is well-supported and should be 
upheld. Where, a sworn statement or plea affidavit is used to buttress the plea colloquy, 
rule 11(e) requires the plea-taking court to "establish that the defendant has read, 
understood, and acknowledged the contents of the sworn statement." In State v. Gibbons, 
740 P.2d 1309, 1314 (Utah 1987), the supreme court held that the burden of establishing i 
rule 11 compliance falls on the plea court, which "should review the statements in the 
affidavit with the defendant, [and] question the defendant concerning his understanding
 ( 
of i t . . . on the record." Gibbions emphasizes that "[i]t is not sufficient to assume that 
defense attorneys make sure that their clients fully understand the contents of the 
affidavit." Id. at 1313. See Visser, 2000 UT 88, f 11 (reiterating "'that the [plea] court 
[must] personally establish that the defendant's guilty plea is truly knowing and 
voluntary and establish on the record that the defendant knowingly waived his or her ( 
constitutional rights'") (quotation omitted). See also State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470,477 
(Utah App. 1991) ("The trial court must conduct an inquiry to establish that the 
defendant understand the affidavit and voluntarily signed it."), cert denied, 836 P.2d 
1383 (Utah 1992). 
The State acknowledges that Gibbons and its progeny can reasonably be read to 
suggest that a plea-taking court must specifically ask during the plea colloquy if a 
defendant has read and understands the plea affidavit. However, the plain language of
 { 
rule 11 does not expressly require such a specific or direct inquiry—only that the plea 
court "establish" on the record that defendant read and understood the affidavit. Thus, 
< 
while a direct or specific inquiry during the plea colloquy is one way, and probably the 
18 
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better practice, to "establish" a defendant's understanding of the plea affidavit, it is not 
the only way. See Maguire 830 P.2d at 218 (rule 11 compliance may be demonstrated by 
"multiple means"). A defendant's understanding may be "established," as it was here, by 
both a defendant and his attorney certifying in open court that the defendant re*<* (or had 
read to him) and understands the plea agreement. The State's view of the above case law 
and rule 11 is consistent with the supreme court's direction to look at the entire record, 
particularly those documents which are clearly part of defendant's knowledge and 
understanding. Id. 
Here, the plea-taking court did not specifically ask if defendant had read and 
understood the plea affidavit. However, as set out in detail in Part B, supra, the plea-
taking court's involved dialogue with defendant (see Rl 19), add. C, spans approximately 
15 transcript pages, and is replete with indications of defendant's undisputed 
understanding of the terms and consequences of the plea, i.e., that a guilty plea could 
result in imposition of the maximum penalty (see R126:5-20), add. B. Moreover, it is 
replete with indications of defendant's undisputed motivation for accepting the plea 
agreement, i.e., to be immediately transferred from the county jail to the prison. As 
earlier emphasized, "[s]trict compliance . . . does not mandate a particular script or rote 
recitation of the rights listed." Visser, 2000 UT 88, f 11. Rather, "the substantive goal of 
rule 11 is to ensure that defendants know of their rights and thereby understand the basic 
consequences of their decision to plead guilty [,]"and "[t]hat goal should not be 
overshadowed or undermined for formalistic ritual." Id. 
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In addition to the plea-taking court's involved dialogue with defendant, the plea 
affidavit was referred to by both the plea court and defense counsel on the record {see, 
e.g., R126:20-24), add, B. The plea court referred to the plea affidavit at the beginning of 
the plea colloquy, and emphasized the importance of having it in each of defendant's 
separate criminal files (R126:4), add. B. Then, as stated, defense counsel read on the ( 
record what he had written in the plea affidavit for the factual bases (R126:20), add. C. 
Later in the colloquy the plea court again referred to the plea affidavit and asked 
defendant to sign it in open court (Rl26:23-4), add. C. Defendant then signed the plea 
affidavit which expresslyLattgsts that he had "fallyjiscuss[edr the gjea^affidayit with 
trial counsel, as well as his "rights, and the consequence^^ (R58), add. 
A. Defense counsel and the plea court followed with their signatures (R 126:23-24), add. 
B. The plea affidavit further attests that < 
•defendant either read the statements contained in the affidavit, or that those 
statements were read to him by his attorney; 
•defendant understood the provisions of the plea affidavit; { 
•defendant knew he was free to change or delete anything contained in the plea 
affidavit, but that he did not wish to make any changes because all of the 
statements were correct; and 
•defendant was 27 years old, attended school through 10th grade, could read and 
understand the English language, was not under the influence of drugs or 
medication that would impair his judgment, and was mentally capable of 
understanding the proceedings- < 
(see R60-61), add. A. 
Underneath defendant's signature, defense counsel certified that he knew 
defendant had read the affidavit or that he had read the affidavit to him (R61-62), add. A. 
20 
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Defense counsel further certified that he had discussed the contents of the affidavit with 
defendant and that in his opinion defendant "fully [understood] the meaning of its 
contents and [was] mentally and physically competent" (R61), add. A. 
All of the above, demonstrates that defendant was well aware of the contents of 
the plea affidavit and the consequences of his guilty plea. To assume otherwise would 
require this Court to believe that in executing the plea affidavit, both defendant and 
defense counsel misrepresented to the plea-taking court that defendant had read and 
understood the contents of the affidavit and that defense counsel had discussed the 
affidavit with defendant. Nothing in the record even remotely suggests such a thing. 
Having attested to the plea-taking court that he had read the affidavit before signing it, 
defendant cannot and does not now argue that he was in fact uninformed regarding its 
contents. See Aplt. Br. at 8. 
More important, the references to the plea affidavit on the record and defendant's 
signing it in open court makes clear that the plea court had the plea statement before it 
and that it considered its contents before accepting defendant's guilty plea as knowing 
and voluntary. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e). That, in conjunction with the plea court's 
careful, probing colloquy, was sufficient to incorporate the plea affidavit into the record 
for purposes of determining strict rule 11 compliance. 
The trial court thus properly determined that the plea affidavit was properly 
incorporated here {see Rl 13, 119), add. C. Despite any arguable technical error in failing 
to spjscificallyL^^ the plea affidavit, the plea 
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afficjavit was before the plea court and^onsidered; thus, the substantive purposes of rule 
11(e) were fully accomplished. 
E. Defendant Does Not Claim That Any Possible Technical 
Error Here Was Harmful or Prejudicial. 
Based on the above, defendant's success on appeal hinges entirely on his claim 
that technical error in incorporating the plea affidavit is alone a sufficient ground to undo 
an otherwise valid guilty plea. Aplt. Br. at 7-8. For reasons set forth above, the State 
disagrees that the instant plea affidavit, referred to and executed in open court, was not 
adequately incorporated here. 
However, even if the Court were to determine the plea affidavit was not properly
 { 
incorporated that fact alone is not a sufficient basis for reversing the motion-to-withdraw-
court. As detailed above, it is clear from the entire record that defendant understood 
everything that rule 11(e) contemplates that he would understand before entering a plea, 
particularly the likelihood of his receiving the maximum possible sentence due to his 
insistence on being sentenced without preparation of a pre-sentence report. Thus, the { 
plea court's formalistic error in not specifically asking if defendant had read and 
understood the plea affidavit was harmless. • 
Harmless error should apply to the guilty plea context. As the Utah Supreme 
Court recently emphasized, "inconsequential" errors do not merit reversal: "[Hjarmless 
error is an error that is sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood 
that it affected the outcome of the proceedings." State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, f 20, 20 
P.3d 888 (quoting State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1227 (Utah 1997)). "Put < 
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differently, an error is harmful only if the likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently 
high that it undermines our confidence in the verdict." Id. This general rule, which 
applies in every other context, is in keeping with rule 30, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, which states, "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not 
affect the substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded." See, e.g., State v. Honie, 
2002 UT 4, fjf 64-65,438 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (deeming any error in the trial court's 
consideration of aggravating factors in imposing capital sentence harmless); Evans, 2001 
UT 22, f 20 (holding that trial court error in refusing to instruct on lesser-included 
offense was harmless); State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975, 980 (Utah 1998) (observing that 
trial court erred in excluding evidence, but that defendant also failed to show any harm or 
that the result would have been different absent the error); State v. Baker, 935 P.2d 503, 
510 (Utah 1997) (adopting the cure-or-waive rule with regard to a trial court's erroneous 
denial of a challenge for cause—a criminal defendant must exercise a peremptory 
challenge, if one is available, against the juror unsuccessfully challenged); State v. 
Menzies, 889 P.2d 393,400 (Utah 1994) (deeming harmless any error in trial court's 
failure to remove prospective jurors defendant found objectionable where defendant did 
not assert that any member of the jury was partial or incompetent); State v. Smith, 2002 
UT App 49, f 9,42 P.3d 1261 (holding that error by trial court in failing to specifically 
submit factual questions relevant to sentence enhancement to jury was harmless). 
Significantly, the Utah Supreme Court applied harmless error to guilty plea 
proceedings arising pre-Gibbons or pre-strict compliance review. In State v. Hojf, 814 
P.2d 1119 (Utah 1991), decided after Gibbons, but involving a pre-Gibbons plea, the 
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supreme court refused to undo a guilty plea based on technical error alone. Id. at 1124. 
Specifically, Hoff argued that he was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because "there 
i 
was some misstatement of the title of the offense to which [he] pleaded," and he was 
therefore "misled." Id. The supreme court agreed that the offense had been misstated but 
found that "the misstatement did not prejudice [Hoff) because he pleaded to an attempt to ( 
commit that crime." Id. Perhaps more significantly, this Court has applied harmlessness 
review in a post-Gibbons case. See State v. Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, f 15, 5 P.3d
 { 
1222 (holding that plea court's failure to inform defendant of the minimum sentence for a 
class A misdemeanor did not result in harmful error). In the same opinion, however, the 
Court also presumed without analysis that failure to advise the defendant of her speedy 
trial right was alone prejudicial. Id. at f 18. 
Importantly, neither Gibbons nor its strict compliance progeny directly hold that < 
harmlessness analysis no longer applies to guilty plea proceedings. Rather, since 
Gibbons, courts have sometimes equated, without analysis, technical non-compliance 
with rule 11 as "good cause" for withdrawing a plea. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6(2) 
(1999 & Supp. 2002) ("A plea of guilty may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown 
and with leave of the court."). Seet e.g., State v. Mills, 898 P.2d 819, 821 (Utah App. 
1995) ("[I]f the trial court failed to strictly comply with [r]ule 11 [] in taking the 
defendant's guilty plea, and subsequently denies the withdrawal of the plea, the trial court { 
has exceeded its permitted range of discretion as a matter of law."); State v. Jennings, 875 
P.2d 566, 569 (Utah App. 1994) ("The trial court has abused its discretion as a matter of 
i 
law if it does not permit a defendant to withdraw a plea that was not made in strict 
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compliance with [r]ule 11 [.]"); State v. Brocksmith, 888 P.2d 703, 704 n.l (Utah App. 
1994) ("A trial court's failure to comply strictly with [r]ule 11 [] in accepting a guilty 
plea is good cause, as a matter of law, for the withdrawal of that plea."). 
Indeed, Tarnawiecki presumes prejudice where essentially "all rule 11 
requirements were covered, except one—the right to a speedy trial before an impartial 
jury." Id. at f 19. In so doing, Tarnawiecki recognized the substantial difference in the 
"quantum of error" between that case and another case presuming prejudice, Ostler, 
where the trial court discussed "only one of the seven [r]ule 11 requirements on the 
record." 2000 UT App 28, f 11. The effect of Tarnawiecki is to raise an essentially 
irrebuttable presumption of prejudice in cases clearly involving no more than technical, 
non-prejudicial, non-compliance with rule 11. This is in contrast to the rule implicitly 
recognized in Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f 11, that strict compliance with rule 11 raises only 
a rebuttable presumption that a plea is voluntary. Thus, while a defendant may rebut the 
presumption raised by strict compliance, the State may never rebut the presumption 
raised by non-strict compliance, no matter how technical or harmless the error. 
Moreover, the equation recognized in Mills, Jennings, and Brocksmith, and 
applied in Tarnawiecki is flawed. If error in a guilty plea proceeding is not harmful, i.e., 
that but for the error defendant would not have pleaded guilty, common sense dictates 
that it is cannot be "good cause" withdrawing a plea. Section 77-13-6(2). Cf. Honie, 
2002 UT 4, f 54 ("[A]n erroneous decision by a trial court cannot result in reversible 
error unless the error is harmful," meaning "that absent the error, there is a sufficiently 
high likelihood of a different outcome" (quotations omitted)); Parsons v. Barnes, 871 
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P.2d 516, 525 (Utah 1994) ("Where a defendant challenges a guilty plea on grounds of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, he or she must show 'a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel's errors, he [or she] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted 
ongoing to trial."). 
Indeed, the majority of jurisdictions recognize the senselessness of undoing guilty 
pleas based on technical error alone and accordingly require a showing of harm. Federal 
courts do so by specific rule. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(h) ("Harmless error. Any variance < 
from the procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial rights shall be 
disregarded."). Several states also have a rule similar to FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(h), requiring 
i 
harmlessness review in the guilty plea context. See, e.g., DEL. SUPER. CT. R. 11(h); D.C. 
CRIM. P. R. 11(h); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-12-213 (2001) (restating Fed. R. Crim. P. 
11(h)); W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 11(h); WYO. R. CRIM. P. 11(h). See also FLA. CRIM. P. R. ( 
3.172(i) ("Prejudice. Failure to follow any of the procedures in this rule shall not render 
a plea void absent a showing of prejudice")-
A number of states apply a general statute or rule, similar to Utah's rule 30 
requirement that technical error <cbe disregarded," to the guilty plea context. See, e.g., 
State v. Guzman, 769 So.2d 1158,1163 (La. 2000) (citing LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 921); 
State v. Hendricks, 531 S.E.2d 896, 898 (N.C. App. 2000) (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 
15A-1443(a)); State v. Newsome, 778 S.W.2d 34, 36 (Tenn. 1989) (citing TENN. R. CRIM. < 
P. 52(a) and TENN. R. APP. P 36(b)); Ducker v. State, 45 S.WJd 791, 795 (Tex. App. 
2001) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b)). See also N.D. R. CRIM. P. 11 (citing N.D. R. 
i 
CRIM. P. 52(a) in explanatory note). 
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However, the majority of states applying harmless error review to technical errors 
in the guilty plea context do so absent any statute or court rule. See, e.g., In re Moser, 
862 P.2d 723, 730 (Cal. 1993) {en banc) (recognizing that "a defendant (even on direct 
appeal) is entitled to relief based upon a trial court's misadvisement only if the defendant 
establishes that he or she was prejudiced by the misadvisement, i.e., that the defendant 
would not have entered the plea of guilty had the trial court given a proper advisement"); 
Young v. People, 30 P.3d 202,204,208 (Colo. 2001) (trial court failure to advise 
defendant regarding parole consequences of plea harmless); State v. Irala, 792 A.2d 109, 
123 (Conn. App.) (trial court failure to tell defendant she could withdraw pleas in the 
event of a different sentence harmless), cert, denied, 797 A.2d 519 (Conn. 2002); State v. 
Cornelio, 727 P.2d 1125,1127 (Haw. 1986) (trial court's failure to inform defendant of 
nature of plea agreement, that trial court was not bound by agreement, and of maximum 
sentence harmless); People v. Woods, 480 N.E.2d 179,183 (111. App. 1985) (trial court's 
failure to specifically ask if any promises had been made to defendant harmless); State v. 
McDaniel, 499 N.E.2d 226,227 (Ind. 1986) (trial court's failure to advise of possible 
increased sentence harmless); State v. Ford, 930 P.2d 1089, 1095-1096 (Kan. App. 1997) 
(trial court's failure to recite element of offense during plea proceeding harmless); People 
v. Young, 250 N.W.2d 523, 525 (Mich. App. 1976) (trial court's error in accepting plea 
absent prosecutor's acknowledgment of plea agreement harmless); State v. Bowley, 938 
P.2d 592, 596-597 (Mont. 1997) (trial court's failure to ask if defendant was under 
influence of drugs or alcohol harmless); State v. Gray, 388 N.W.2d 836, 837 (Neb.1986) 
("Mere failure to comply with precise ceremonial or verbal formality in arraignment and 
27 
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entry of a plea does not require setting aside a defendant's guilty plea which was 
otherwise entered in accordance with statutory and constitutional requirements"); State v. 
Riker, 905 P.2d 706, 710 (Nev.) (trial court's failure to state correct sentence not 
prejudicial), cert denied, 517 U.S. 1194 (1996); State v. Garland, 544 A.2d 417, 422 
(N.J. App.) (trial court's failure to inform defendant of possible consecutive sentence 
harmless), certification denied, 554 A.2d 845 (NJ. 1988); State v. Garcia, 915 P.2d 300, 
302 (N.M. 1996) ("We hold . . . that absent a showing of prejudice to the defendant's 
right to understand his guilty plea and its consequences, substantial compliance with 
[guilty plea rule] is sufficient."); People v. Empey, 531 N.Y.S.2d 37, 38 (N.Y. App. 
1988) (trial court's error in allowing prosecutor to participate in plea allocution did not 
warrant reversal of defendant's conviction based on his guilty plea); State v. Gales, 721 
N.E.2d 497, 500 (Ohio App. 1999) ("The test is whether the court's error prejudiced the 
defendant in that he would not have pled guilty had the error not been made[;]" here, 
unlikely defendant would have refused plea agreement had he known potential fine was 
less than that stated by trial court); Carey v. State, 902 P.2d 1116,1117-1118 (Okl. App. 
1995) (finding both harmless and harmful error in plea proceeding); State v. Frizell, 627 
P.2d 21,23 (Ore. App. 1981) (trial court's failure to inform defendant of the possibility 
of deportation not prejudicial); Commonwealth v. McNeill, 305 A.2d 51,53 (Pa. 1973) 
(trial court's failure to inform defendant of possible maximum sentence harmless); State 
v. Van Egdom, 292 N.W.2d 586, 589 (S.D. 1980) (trial court's failure to make a verbatim 
record of plea agreement did not rise to the level of prejudicial error). 
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It is the rare case where prejudicial error is not a prerequisite to reversal. See, e.g., 
Honie, 2002 UT 4, ffl[ 64-65, (deeming any error in the trial court's consideration of 
aggravating factors in imposing capital sentence harmless); Evans, 2001 UT 22, f 20 
(holding that trial court error in refusing to instruct on lesser-included offense was 
harmless); Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975, 980 (observing that trial court erred in excluding 
evidence, but that defendant also failed to show any harm or that the result would have 
been different absent the error); Baker, 935 P.2d at 510 (adopting the cure-or-waive rule 
with regard to a trial court's erroneous denial of a challenge for cause—a criminal 
defendant must exercise a peremptory challenge, if one is available, against the juror 
unsuccessfully challenged); Menzies, 889 P.2d at 400 (deeming harmless any error in 
trial court's failure to remove prospective jurors defendant found objectionable when 
defendant did not assert that any of the jury was partial or incompetent); Smith, 2002 UT 
App 49, f 9, (holding that error by trial court in failing to specifically submit factual 
questions relevant to sentence enhancement to jury was harmless). This is because 
judicial resources are not lightly expended. For the same reasons Utah courts are 
reluctant to undo the result of a trial absent prejudicial error, Utah courts should be 
equally reluctant to undo a guilty plea proceeding absent any demonstration that the 
claimed error prejudiced the defendant. Absent such a requirement, criminal defendants 
and their counsel will have an incentive to sow error. Cf. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 
76,131, 12 P.3d 92 (refusing to sanction "invited error" in the jury selection context); 
State v. Anderson 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996) (recognizing a defendant "cannot 
lead the court into error by failing to object and then later, when he is displeased with the 
29 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
verdict, profit by his actions" (quotation omitted)); State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 
(Utah 1989) ("If trial counsel were permitted to forego objecting to evidence as part of a 
trial strategy that counsel thinks will enhance the defendant's chances of acquittal and 
then if that strategy fails, were permitted to claim on appeal that the Court should reverse 
because it was plain error for the court to admit the evidence, we would be sanctioning a 
procedure that fosters invited error."), cert denied, 497 U.S. 1024 (1990). 
For example, even though defense counsel may be aware that the plea court has < 
missed a minor step or word, he or she will best serve the defendant's interests by 
remaining silent so as to allow the defendants to take a chance on the plea, and if it 
i 
ultimately turns out to be unsatisfactory, to then successfully move to withdraw their 
plea, not because their plea is involuntary, but because the plea court made a technical 
error. This is particularly true after State v. Ostler, 2002 UT 68, f 13, 31 P.3d 528, held ( 
that defendants may move post-sentencing to withdraw their guilty pleas. Defendants 
who are satisfied with their pleas at the time they entered them, often become dissatisfied -
after they learn their sentence. Thus, allowing withdrawal of a plea based on mere 
technical error without a showing of prejudice will encourage defendant's and their 
counsel to sow error as a safety hatch, thereby leading to a waste of judicial resources. 
See Baker, 935 P.2d at 506 ("[A]ll parties, including the defense, have a duty not to sow 
error[.] Both parties and the court share a duty to help ensure a fair trial[.]"). < 
Existing law and public policy seek to protect valuable judicial resources from 
abuses like that described above. Accordingly, in Utah "[a] plea of guilty may be 
•
 { 
withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with leave of the court." Section 77-13-
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6(2). Withdrawing is a privilege, not a right. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f 9; State v. Thorup, 
841 P.2d 746, 747 (Utah App. 1992). Valuable judicial resources should not be 
expended to undo a guilty plea on grounds of non-prejudicial, formalistic error where the 
defendant does not contend that he did not understand or know the consequences of his 
plea. This is especially true in cases like this, where the record demonstrates that the 
plea-taking court actively engaged defendant in a colloquy regarding the plea agreement 
and defendant undisputedly understood the terms and consequences of his decision to 
plead guilty. 
As noted above, Utah's rules of criminal procedure provide generally that "[a]ny 
error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial rights of a 
party shall be disregarded." UTAH R. CRIM. P. 30. There is simply no meaningful reason 
to distinguish rule 30 's application to technical trial court error from its application to 
technical plea court error. Its plain language makes no such distinction. Therefore, this 
Court should apply rule 30 to the instant guilty plea proceeding and "disregardQ" the 
claim of error here because defendant fails to demonstrate that it affected his "substantial 
rights." 
In sum, defendant has not and cannot demonstrate that the plea-taking court's 
failure to specifically ask whether he read and understood the plea affidavit was 
prejudicial on these facts. Defendant has not and cannot demonstrate that he would have 
refused to plead guilty if the trial court had specifically asked whether he had read and 
understood the plea affidavit. Accordingly, any arguable error in failing to do so was 
harmless and should therefore "be disregarded." UTAH R. CRIM. P. 30. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant's first degree felony conviction for aggravated robbery should be 
affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED ^September 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
JUAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDIClAfrjDjrjjTjLiell C0(/j)|> 
IM AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF U^Afl
 9 
SAtTUXE 
'
n
 ' • ; : o f 
C
°UNTV 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v». 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT , 0 ^ 0 ^ 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
AND ORDER 
CASE NO. M/4/*##J&> -#*4 
dCtf/g/<!><£"*$ -ter/Htss 
CCMES NOW , the defendant in this 
case and hereby acknowledges and certifies the following: 
I am entering a plea of guilty to the following crime(s): 
DEGREE 
A. 
B. 
CRIME & STATUTORY 
PROVISION 
PUNISHMENT 
Min/Max and/or 
/fyf. Minimum Mandatory 
fy- 7Jm y/ft/v *£^t *p**ti 
Mss/rAfrm? 
ckstAiKars^ &?&&> ftf/V 
c. 
D. 
3 /18 /99 
r\ 
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4 
I have received a copy of the Information against me, I have 
read it, and I understand the nature and elements of the offense (s) 
for which I am pleading guilty. 
The elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as 
follows: 
nu4t 
<Uto4 Ato/»tfj>i*j? 
fo&t p fy Conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am 
criminally liable that constitutes the elements of the crime(s) 
charged, is as follows:. 
I am entering
 /*{h^ 5r/these jtfiea(s) voluntarily and with 
knowledge and understanding of the following facts: 
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an 
attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be 
appointed by the Court at no cost to me. I recognize that a 
condition of my sentence may be to require me to pay an amount, as 
determined by the Court, to recoup the cost of counsel if so 
appointed for me. 
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2. Isrfhave no#) (&a*e) waived my right to counsel. If I hav 
waived my right to counsel, I have done so knowingly 
intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
3 . I f I fr?v* waiTrnH my riqhfe tio IJLJUII&HI^ T l^v i i miri ^ i s 
statement and understandthejaa£*«^^ of the charges, my 
rights in tl^rS-t^e^'and other proceedings, and the consequences of 
jny jri^iT^f guilty, 
ItH 
4. If I
 Ahave not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is 
7b d* JSffJtS , and I have had an opportunity to fully 
discuss this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my 
guilty plea with my attorney. 
5. I know that I have a right to a speedy trial in open 
court by an impartial jury and that I am giving up that right by 
pleading guilty. 
6. I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or to have them 
cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I have the right 
to compel my witness (s) by subpoena at State expense to testify in 
court in my behalf. I understand that I am giving up these rights 
if I plead guilty. 
7. I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf; 
but if I choose not to do so I cannot be compelled to testify or 
give evidence against myself; and no adverse inferences will be 
drawn against me if I do not testify. I understand that I am 
giving up these rights if I plead guilty. 
8. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me I 
need only plead "not guilty," and the matter will be set for trial. 
At the trial the State of Utah will have the burden of proving each 
element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is 
before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous. 
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9. I understand the fact that as a defendant I enjoy the 
right of a presumption of innocence. I understand that I am 
presumed innocent until the State proves my guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, if this case is tried to a jury, or until I plead 
guilty. I understand that I give up the right to the presumption 
of innocence if I plead guilty. 
10. I know that under the Constitution of Utah, if I were 
tried and convicted by a jury or by the Judge, I would have the 
right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah Court of 
Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court and that if I 
could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs 
would be paid by the State. I understand that I am giving up these 
rights if I plead guilty. 
11. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each 
offense to which I plead guilty. I know that by pleading guilty to 
an offense that carries a minimum mandatory sentence, I will be 
subjecting myself to serving a minimum mandatory sentence for that 
offense. I know that the sentence may be consecutive and may be 
for a prison term, fine, or both. I know that in addition to a 4 
fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed. I 
also know that I may be ordered by the Court to make restitution to 
any victim(s) of my crimes, including any restitution that may be 
owed on charges that are dismissed, if any, as a result of this i 
plea agreement. 
12. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods, 
or the fine for an additional amount if my plea is to more than one 
charge. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or 
awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been 
convicted or to which I have pled guilty, my plea in the present 
action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me. 
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13. I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am 
waiving and giving up my statutory and constitutional rights set 
out in the preceding paragraphs. I also know that by entering such 
plea(s), I am admitting and do so admit that I have committed the 
conduct alleged and that I am guilty of the crime(s) for which my 
plea(s) is/are entered. 
14. My/£lea)s) ofy^i^J^(he-dB^t) the result of a plea 
bargain between myself ancTthe prosecuting attorney. The promises, 
duties, and provisions of this plea bargain, if any, are fully 
contained in this statement. 
15. I know and understand that any motion to withdraw my 
plea(s) of guilty must be for good cause, in writing, and must be 
filed within thirty (30) days after entry of my guilty plea. 
16. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a 
reduction of the charges for sentencing, made or sought by either 
defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on the 
Judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what 
they believe the Court may do are also not binding on the Court. 
17. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind 
has been made to induce me to plead guilty, and no promises except 
those contained in this statement, have been made to me. 
18. J have* reed this statement, or I have had it read to me 
by my aLtUIWJT/«<^ understand its provisions. I know that I am 
free to e|p|fiei£ oc dtflete anything contained in this statement. I 
do not wisW W **km any changes because all of the statements are 
correct. 
19. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my 
attorney. 
I A 
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20. I am J& years of age; I have attended school through 
the /h -^ -^  grade; and I can read and understand the English 
language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been 
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, 
medication, or intoxicants which would impair my judgment when the 
decision was made to enter the plea(s). I am not presently under 
the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair 
my judgment. 
21. I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind; 
mentally capable of understanding the proceedings and the 
consequences of my plea; and free of any mental disease, defect, or 
impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily entering my plea. 
22. Other: Atfn»44 ~j(U*& *M/9/fr/<6f^ 4*T/> 
Dated this^f^^day of 
DEFENDANT 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
V 'M^z 
I certify that I am the attorney for. ^ g^^SpEM 
the defendant above, and that I know he/she has read the statement 
or that I have read it to him/her; and I have discussed it with 
him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of 
its contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best 
of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the 
elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the 
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defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along 
with the other representations and declarations made by the 
defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are acprfrate and true. 
ATTORNEY FOR DE 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the 
case against , defendant. I have 
reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the factual 
basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the 
offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, 
or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The 
plea negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the 
attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the 
Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence 
would support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for 
which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance of the 
plea(s) would serve the public interest. 
^£u 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY/BAR # 
ORDER 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and 
the certification of the defendant and counsel, the Court witnesses 
the signatures and finds that the defendant's plea(s) of guilty is 
freely and voluntarily made, and it is so ordered that the 
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defendant's/plea(s) of guilty to the Charge(s) set forth in the 
Statement be-a€cepted and entered. 
Dated this C$r<£iy
 cf_ z&L 
( . * 
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Salt Lake City, Utah; Friday, April 20, 2001/ A.M. 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Mr. Biggs, what's your matter? 
MR. BIGGS: Good morning, your Honor. Can we take 
Gustavo Mora? He's in custody. It's numbers nine, ten, and 
twelve. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. BIGGS: It's a pretrial conference. 
MS. WISSLER: Your honor --
THE COURT: I beg your pardon. I did not hear. 
MS. WISSLER: Sirena Wissler, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. All right. The cases before 
the court next are State versus Gustavo Mora, 001917882, 
001918102, and 001918169. Likewise, these -- at least the last 
matter is a first-degree felony. In fact the others are. So 
this matter is being recorded by a court reporter and the video 
record has been terminated. 
Mr. Biggs, tell me what is anticipated today. 
MR. BIGGS: Your Honor, we have reached an agreement 
in these three cases. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. BIGGS: Here is the agreement, your Honor. Just 
exactly as you stated them, the court numbers, I put them in 
the Statement of Defendant, Certificate of Counsel, and Order. 
3 
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1 THE COURT: Okay. Now, let me ask you to pause 
2 there. I'm going to need a Statement of Defendant in each 
3 file. You know that. 
4 MR. BIGGSz Do you want me to do three? 
5 THE COURT: Well, I think I do so that each is 
6 complete. Now, I'm not going to ask you to rewrite three. 
7 What we could probably do is copy them, then highlight the 
8 number for each one. But I want three signed. 
9 MR. BIGGS: That's fine. 
10 THE COURT: So I get three into the book. 
11 MR. BIGGS: We'll do that. 
12 THE COURT: Ms. Wissler, did you have a concern? 
13 MS. WISSLER: Yes, your Honor. Just for 
14 clarification, our understanding in this case is defendant will 
15 only be entering the plea in one case and the other two will be 
16 dismissed. 
17 I THE COURT: Oh, that will change the ruling. Okay. 
18 I'm sorry. Tell me what the agreement is. 
19 MR. BIGGS: Yes, your Honor. In 001917882 --
20 THE COURT: Okay. Let's just use the last three 
21 digits. So 882. 
22 MR. BIGGS: In 882 he will be pleading guilty as 
23 charged in count one to an aggravated robbery with the use of a 
24 gun and count two will be dismissed. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. 
4 
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MR. BIGGS: The other two files are going to be 
dismissed. 
THE COURT: All right. Okay. Then, I had a 
misunderstanding at the beginning. That's fine. So it's 
guilty as charged, first-degree felony, and there is an 
enhanced penalty associated with this with a firearm. Is that 
right? 
MR. BIGGS: That's correct. There's a mandatory one 
year and can be a zero to five. 
THE COURT: Now, this is a first-degree felony so it 
is a mandatory one year on the minimum. So it's six to life 
rather than five to life. 
MR. BIGGS: Correct. 
THE COURT: Is that your understanding as well, 
Mr. Mora? 
THE DEPENDANT: No. I'm pleading guilty to a 
five-to-life. That's all. 
THE COURT: Right. Plus with the -- that's what 
you're pleading guilty to, is a five-to-life, but there is a 
firearm enhancement because there was a firearm used and that 
adds a mandatory one year to that. 
THE DEFENDANT: All right. All right. I'll plead 
guilty to that, but I need to say a few words. 
THE COURT: You can say whatever you like. 
THE DEFENDANT: My lawyer is telling me that 
5 
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California prison's going to come pick me up soon. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
THE DEFENDANT: You know, I want to hear that from 
you. 
THE COURT: I don't know that. I don't have any idea 
about it. 
THE DEPENDANT: So I don't understand. 
MR. BIGGS: Your Honor, here's the situation. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. BIGGS: Mr. Mora is facing these charges in Utah. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. BIGGS: He informs me that he is also on parole 
in California, and California has indicated, through his parole 
officer, that they are going to charge him with what's called a 
three-strikes violation. 
THE COURT: Habitual criminal. 
MR. BIGGS: That's correct. That's a 25-year-to-life 
in California. He wanted to know if California can come and 
get him. I said in my opinion California and Utah would speak 
and California would say we're going to have him for 25 years 
to life, you've got him for six to life. We'll take him. And 
Utah would agree with that. I told him that I wasn't 
guaranteeing that, that you couldn't guarantee that, that based 
upon my experience that's what would happen. 
THE COURT: Okay. Do you understand that, Mr. Mora? 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 That is now the explanation. Do you understand what he has 
2 just said? You have to answer out loud. 
3 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. What he's saying, there's no way 
5 that Utah can control California and no way that California can 
6 control Utah. They each have independent convictions. 
7 THE DEPENDANT: So most likely I'm going to go do the 
8 five to life in seven to ten years, and then they'll pick me 
9 up, or what? 
10 THE COURT: Well, that will be up to them to decide. 
11 THE DEFENDANT: To who? 
12 THE COURT: California. California cam put a hold on 
13 you and they can take you after you served your Utah time. 
14 They could also say, okay, he's served six years in Utah, we're 
15 going to terminate his parole unsuccessful. They could do 
16 that. 
17 THE DEFENDANT: All right. If I take this five to 
18 life, the feds won't prosecute me on any gun charges; right? 
19 THE COURT: I can't assure you of that. The feds can 
20 decide whatever they're going to decide. 
21 I I'll tell you what, you cam just go to trial. Do 
22 you want to do that? Because you have got --in fact, you have 
23 got a first-degree felony here. You've got a first and a 
24 second in one case. You've got a first and a -- two firsts in 
2 5 another case, and you've got a first in a third case. You can 
7 
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go to trial on all of these. Would you rather do that? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. I'm just going to go ahead and 
take the five to life. 
THE COURT: It's not five to life. It's six to life. 
THE DEFENDANT: Well, whatever it is. 
THE COURT: Okay. So you're going to take one and 
have the others dismissed. Is that what you want to do? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. They're going to send me out 
to prison today, something like that? 
MR. BIGGS: One other thing, your Honor. He's 
requesting to be sentenced today. I told hdLm that he has the 
right to ask the court to do that, and he would prefer doing 
that because he doesn't want to be in the county facility any 
longer. 
THE COURT: Let me tell you what -- there's a problem 
you may not understand with respect to that. Whenever anyone 
is sent to the prison we get -- before they're sentenced we get 
what they call a presentence investigative report. Now, I 
don't think we have ever had any report of that nature in Utah. 
Is that correct, Mr. Biggs? 
MR. BIGGS: That's correct. 
THE COURT: So California has, basically, all your 
criminal history and data. We probably have rap sheets and 
information that is initially available, but we don't have all 
the data here. If you go out to the prison today, then 
8 
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1 somebody has to do what is called a post-sentence report for 
2 the Board of Pardons, which is just the same as a presentence 
3 report, only it is done after. So we have to get the report, 
4 period. And it changes who does the reporting. My normal 
5 preference is to use the presentence investigative people 
6 because they do that report all the time. 
7 (Defendant speaks inaudibly.) 
8 I THE COURT: Go ahead and speak up. 
9 THE DEFENDANT: If I can't get sentenced today and 
10 sent out to prison today, I'll go ahead and take all that to 
11 trial because --
12 THE COURT: You can do whatever you like. 
13 THE DEFENDANT: Because I want to go out to the 
14 prison as soon as possible. I don't like that county jail. I 
15 don't like to be there, you know. I just want to -- that's the 
16 only reason I'm taking this, because I'm not comfortable being 
17 in the county jail. I don't even like it while I'm living 
18 there. 
19 THE COURT: All you'll do -- the jail shouldn't have 
20 anything to do it, and I'll tell you why. Because if you want 
21 to just take the trial and try them all and run the risk of 
22 being convicted of, I think, five first-degree felonies, which 
23 could then been consecutive -- you know the sentence could 
24 be -- what you're looking by this sentence, if I accept it, is 
25 you're limiting me to only one sentence. But you could go 
9 
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1 ahead and try them all, but you will stay in the county jail 
2 the whole time you're trying them and then you'll still be in 
3 the county jail for another six weeks to get a presentence 
4 report. So there is no way you're getting out of the county 
5 jail today by whatever decision you want to make. You don't 
6 control the decision. Is that clear? 
7 THE DEFENDANT: So it will take how long? If I was 
8 to wait, it will take how long? 
9 THE COURT: To try them? 
10 THE DEFENDANT: No. So you could sentence me to five 
11 to life? 
12 MR. BIGGS: It takes 45 days. 
13 THE COURT: If you plead today, I will order a 
14 presentence report and it will take me, plus or minus, 45 days. 
15 THE DEFENDANT: I'm going to take it all to trial. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. If you don't plead today --
17 THE DEFENDANT: I'm not going to plead guilty. I'm 
18 not guilty on nothing. I'm going -- I'm going back to the --
19 THE COURT: Okay. 
20 I THE DEFENDANT: I don't want to take it. 
21 THE COURT: Just so you understand the deal. Okay? 
22 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
23 THE COURT: If you don't plead today --
24 THE DEFENDANT: I'm not going to plead. If I'm not 
25 going to prison today, I don't want no deal, no nothing. I'll 
10 
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1 just take it to trial. 
2 THE COURT: Well, if you'll stop and listen to me for 
3 a minute. 
4 Do you understand that if you don't plead today that 
5 what we'll do is we'll set three different trials? 
6 THE DEPENDANT: That's what I want. That's what I 
7 want. 
8 THE COURT: They will be set in 30, 60, 90 days, 
9 something like that. 
10 THE DEFENDANT: It doesn't matter. I want to go 
11 today. My mind is set to leaving today. That's what he's been 
12 telling me. So if this ain't going to happen that way, the way 
13 he told me, you'll be gone tomorrow, that's fine. You know, 
14 I'm expecting that to happen today. If it can't happen that 
15 way, I'm fighting everything, you know. 
16 THE COURT: What's the State's decision? 
17 MS. WISSLER: Judge, the State's position is that all 
18 three cases are set for trial beginning May 3rd. I think the 
19 problem is this is a situation for Mr. Biggs and I to get 
20 together, make a decision as to which one of these cases should 
21 be tried first. One has a codefendant represented by 
22 IMs. Miller and she's not available the 3rd, 4th, and 8th of 
23 May, so I don't believe we'll be in a position to try the case 
24 where there is a codefendant. But I think, given Mr. Mora's 
25 position today, I think we ought to be prepared to go forward 
11 
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to try one of these cases May 3rd. 
MR. BIGGS: May I suggest, your Honor, the case that 
he was going to plead guilty to ending in 7882. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let me also explain one other 
thing to you, Mr. Mora. It's the Court's rule that if there 
are --if there is going to be a plea it needs to be decided at 
the pretrial. This is an opportunity for you to get a lesser 
total conviction than would happen potentially at trial. So 
from here on, I won't accept a plea unless it's as charged on 
all three cases. So I don't know what the evidence is, but you 
just need to know this is your last chance to negotiate a 
lesser resolution. 
THE DEFENDANT: If I get sentenced today, like I 
said, if you're going to sentence me --
THE COURT: You already told me. 
THE DEFENDANT: No. I'm just saying that's what I 
was told. You know, that's what I was told. So that's what I 
have in my mind, that I'm going to prison today. That's what I 
thought. So if it ain't going to happen that way, I'm going to 
take everything to trial, you know. 
THE COURT: That's just fine. 
THE DEFENDANT: You know, I don't have -- I don't 
have no other, you know, answer to that, you know. I don't got 
nothing to say. 
THE COURT: What's the reason that you think it's so 
12 
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important for you to go to prison today? 
THE DEPENDANT: I need -- because I don't want --
look, I'm from L.A. county jail, you know. I don't like this 
county jail, you know. I'd rather be in prison. I'd rather be 
in prison 50 years than to be in that county jail another day. 
That's just the way I feel, you know. I would rather do fifty 
years in that prison. That's why I was taking a five-to-life. 
Only for that reason, that I was going out to that prison 
today, not tomorrow, today. That's what I thought. That's 
what he told me. That's why I said I'll take the five to life. 
THE COURT: Well, let me ask AP&P. Who does the 
presentence reports and who does the post-sentence reports? Is 
there any difference in those that I should be concerned with? 
AP&P REPRESENTATIVE: No, your Honor. There 
shouldn't be at all. It wouldn't really matter if you do a 
sentence. We refer it and we have agents at the prison that 
would do the post-sentence follow-up report. 
THE COURT: Okay. I will tell you that I would 
probably, if I had my preference, Mr. Biggs, I'd probably just 
as soon try all of these and deal with them thereafter, if that 
were my choice. 
MR. BIGGS: I understand. It's to my client's 
benefit to take this offer. 
THE DEFENDANT: I want to take it. 
MR. BIGGS: To my client's benefit to be sentenced 
13 
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today, and I would ask the court -- even though it is not your 
normal routine, that you sentence him today to the state prison 
on the six years to life. 
THE COURT: There --it sounds to me like there are 
some reasons why I might like to have the ability to consec a 
couple of these. I would like to know what the real facts are. 
MR. BIGGS: Well, your Honor, what he's pleading 
guilty to is -- I understand, and if he were to go to trial and 
be convicted, you would have that option. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. BIGGS: That's the reason we want him to plead 
today, because basically he's pleading to a first-degree felony 
with the use of a gun, which we know is going to be six years 
to life, and that's what we anticipate. That's what he knows 
he is going to go out to prison on, and that's what we're 
asking the Court to do today. 
THE COURT: Does the State have any further 
information? 
MS. WISSLER: Your Honor, I -- just simply to remind 
the court that the enhancement that is at issue in this case 
carries, of course, the mandatory one-year consecutive, but 
also, statutorily, there is the possibility of a discretionary 
additional zero to five on top of that. 
THE COURT: How can I do that, if I sentence today? 
MS. WISSLER: That is just at the court's discretion. 
14 
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You're entitled by statute, the way the gun enhancement is 
written, to impose an additional zero to five weapon 
enhancement just to reflect the --
THE COURT: Is there any allegation weapons were used 
in the other charges? 
MS. WISSLER: Yes. 
THE COURT: A gun? 
MS. WISSLER: Yes. 
MR. BIGGS: One was a knife. 
MS. WISSLER: But one was a gun. 
THE COURT: It looks to me like one may have been a 
screw driver on the aggravated robbery. Let me see. What's 
the other. 
MS. WISSLER: The other was a gun. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, you tell me what do you want 
to do? I'm probably not going to send you to prison today, and 
if I do, if I accept the plea I'll probably give you five 
years' enhancement for firearms, which will give you a 
ten-to-life sentence. 
THE DEPENDANT: I Ml take the six to life, your 
Honor, you know. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'll give you six to life under 
this condition, that I wouldn't send you today. I'm going to 
get a presentence report because I'm going to look at it. 
THE DEPENDANT: No, no, no. See, I want to leave 
15 
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1 today. I want --
2 THE COURT: Okay. Let's just try the cases. You 
3 will not hereafter be allowed to plead to anything less. 
4 THE DEFENDANT: What do you mean about ten to life? 
5 THE COURT: You see, what you're trying to do, 
6 Mr. Mora, you're trying to tell me what I'm going to sentence 
7 you on. 
8 THE DEFENDANT: No. I never told you -- I never told 
9 you to do nothing, your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: Just stop and listen to me for a minute. 
11 I have the right to sentence you, if you plead guilty on a 
12 five-to-life, I can sentence you in not less than two days, 
13 which means today, or after a report. There is a one --
14 minimum number one-year enhancement for a firearm, which makes 
15 that five to life, six to life, but that is -- there's also 
16 discretion in sentencing that that could be a minimum of up to 
17 five years added. So it could be ten to life. 
18 THE DEFENDANT: All right. Give me --
19 THE COURT: Now, you're trying not to give me the 
20 opportunity to learn about the facts of the other cases. If 
21 you are convicted on all of these cases, I can sentence you 
22 consecutive on every one of them, one after the other. So the 
23 minimum times cam be five to life or six to life, six to life, 
24 six to life. So that's 18 plus or minus years to life. I 
25 can -- and you're giving me the impression that you're not to 
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be a trustworthy man and you're giving me the impression that 
you ought to spend a lot of time in prison. Now, if you want 
to be a little more cooperative and give me the opportunity to 
look at the presentence report before I sentence you, then I 
would feel better about giving you something within ten to life 
or five to life or six to life. 
THE DEFENDANT: So --
THE COURT: I'd feel better about that, but I don't 
feel good about you coming in here and telling me what you're 
going to get. 
THE DEFENDANT: No, I never said what I'm going to 
get. I'm just going by what my lawyer is telling me. 
THE COURT: Okay. I know your lawyer. I know what 
they're telling you, and I know what you're willing to listen 
to. You seem not willing to listen to a lot. 
THE DEFENDANT: I'm listening. 
THE COURT: Let me ask you this. Do you want to 
accept the plea, five to life with a mandatory one-year gun 
enhamcement and a presentence report before sentencing? Or do 
you want to take them all to trial? 
THE DEFENDANT: Give me the ten, the ten that you 
said, the way you explained it. Give me the ten years so I can 
leave today. It doesn't matter if you add smother four years 
to it. It doesn't matter. Give me the ten years, but sentence 
today so it will be the way you said at first. 
17 
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1 THE COURT: So give you the maximum that I could if I 
2 accepted the plea. 
3 THE DEPENDANT: No. You know what? I'm taking this 
4 to trial. You know, I'm taking it to trial because now you 
5 want to give me the max, you know. 
6 THE COURT: That's all I can. That's what you're 
7 saying. Give you the maximum that I can if I accept your plea. 
8 THE DEFENDANT: How much is it? 
9 THE COURT: Well, that's ten to life if I accept your 
10 plea. If I don't accept your plea -- and I don't feel 
11 comfortable about that because I don't know the factual 
12 I background. But that's ten to life, or you cam take them all 
13 to trial. You know what the evidence is. 
14 THE DEPENDANT: It ain't really nothing. You know 
15 what? I'm going to California, do 25 to life. It doesn't 
16 matter what you give me. I'm never -- I'm never going to get 
17 out from over there, you know. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. 
19 THE DEPENDANT: That's why it doesn't matter to me if 
20 I I take ten years to life; it doesn't matter. I'll take them 
21 because I'm going to this prison, and from here, whenever I get 
22 out, I'm going over there and they're going to give me 25 to 
23 life, and I know it, you know, because I really have a lot of 
24 strikes, you know, and I know I got to go fight more charges 
25 over there. 
18 
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THE COURT: Well, what do you want to do about that 
sentence on behalf of Mr. Mora. Ten to life? 
MR. BIGGS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Whatfs the State's position? 
MS. WISSLER: Judge, actually the firearm enhancement 
provides that it would be six to life plus a consecutive zero 
to five. So the Board of Pardons takes jurisdiction after he 
serves the mandatory six and it is up to the Board of Pardons 
to decide how much of the zero to five he serves. So it could 
be something less than ten to life. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MS. WISSLER: But our position, given what happened 
today, is that the appropriate thing, that if Adult Probation 
and Parole is willing to do a post-sentence report instead of a 
presentence report, it has always been and will always be our 
position with respect to Mr. Mora that he should go to prison. 
The reason --in fact, the only reason that an offer was made 
in connection with these cases is because of the victims being 
fearful and somewhat unwilling to come in. They have 
participated in preliminary hearings, but we have had several 
requests from victims, because of the fear factor, to resolve 
these cases and that's why we resolved it. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you want to resolve it 
that way, Mr. Mora? Ten to life? 
THE DEFENDANT: It's going to be six to life, right? 
19 
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THE COURT: Right. Six minimum, and then the Board 
of Pardons can decide whether to let you out within the next 
five, 
THE DEFENDANT: All right, I'll do it then. 
THE COURT: Is that the deal you want? 
THE DEPENDANT: Yeah, I'll take it. 
THE COURT: Okay. Now, the first thing I want to 
know is did you do the conduct that gives rise to the charge. 
THE DEFENDANT: What? 
THE COURT: You're charged with am aggravated 
robbery, that on other about October 11th, 2000, that you, with 
the use of a dangerous weapon, by force or fear -- I don't know 
the name of the complaining witness. 
Can you give me any more about the circumstances? 
MR. BIGGS: Your Honor, I put in the factual bases as 
follows: On October 11th, 2000, in Salt Lake County, I took 
personal property from the victim, and I had -- and possessed a 
gun that got the victim to give me the money. 
This particular case, your Honor, was on a video 
tape which I have observed and that's exactly what occurred. 
THE COURT: Okay. Did you do that? 
THE DEFENDANT: I plead guilty to that. 
THE COURT: Okay. You acknowledge you did that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. I plead guilty to that one 
right there, to the first degree. 
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THE COURT: Okay. All right. Let me ask you a 
couple of questions. Mr. Mora, we've had a lengthy discussion 
here about whether you could bring that matter to trial. 
First, let me ask you, have ever been accused of a 
criminal offense in Utah or California or amywhere that you did 
take to trial? 
THE DEFENDANT: I never took nothing to trial. 
THE COURT: Okay. So your conviction in California 
is based on a plea as well. 
THE DEFENDANT: All plea bargains. 
THE COURT: All plea bargains. Okay. And usually 
with a plea bargain you get less than what you're charged with, 
isn't that your understanding? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. Right now under the conditions I 
have from California it doesn't matter to me if you -- if it 
was 20 years that we talked about, me and my lawyer — 
THE COURT: Right. 
THE DEFENDANT: If it was that, I know what I got to 
do over there. 
THE COURT: Right., . Okay. 
THE DEFENDANT: Now, it doesn't really matter how 
much time I do here, you know, because I'm already stuck, you 
know. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
THE DEFENDANT: I'm already stuck. I accept it. 
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1 Now, I want to get this over with and go to prison and do my 
2 time. 
3 THE COURT: All right. But you know that you don't 
4 have to plea; you can take the matter to trial. We talked 
5 about that. If there were a trial we would call an impartial 
6 jury, citizens to come in. 
7 THE DEFENDANT: I know it's a trial, but, look, I'm 
8 tired of that county jail. I been there six months. I don't 
9 want to be there another date. That's why I'm taking this. 
10 THE COURT: Okay. Listen for a minute more. You 
11 have rights associated with a trial that you're waiving by 
12 entering this plea. So there will be no trial. Do you 
13 understand that? 
14 THE DEFENDANT: No trial. 
15 I THE COURT: Right. And if there were a trial we 
16 would call an impartial jury. Every one of the jurors would 
17 have to agree before you could be convicted. We would, in the 
18 course of the trial, call witnesses, the State would. And with 
19 Mr. Biggs1 assistance you could cross-examine the State's 
20 witnesses. You could compel witnesses to testify in your 
21 behalf. You could testify yourself or you could remain silent. 
22 If you remain silent, no presumption as to your guilt could be 
23 drawn by that silence. Do you understand each and all of these 
24 rights would be waived by this plea? 
25 THE DEPENDANT: Yes, I do. 
22 
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THE COURT: Okay. You clearly understand the penalty 
for this offense. We spent a lot of time talking for that. 
THE DEFENDANT: I understand. 
THE COURT: Talking about that. 
THE DEFENDANT: I understand. 
THE COURT: All right, then. And understand that 
without a trial you're waiving also rights associated with 
appeal. Obviously, the appeals court can't review a trial that 
doesn't happen. 
THE DEFENDANT: I know that. 
THE COURT: You understand. Okay. And if you enter 
your plea today you may withdraw, anytime within 30 days of 
this date, for good cause shown; otherwise you'll be barred 
from withdrawing your plea. Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Have you been satisfied with 
the advice given to you by Mr. Biggs? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, yes, I'm satisfied. 
THE COURT: Do you have amy questions of him or me? 
THE DEFENDANT: I don't have no questions. 
THE COURT: All right. Would you sign -- remove --
are you right handed? 
THE DEFENDANT: I'm right handed. 
THE COURT: Remove the hand restraints, please. 
And sign of the Statement of Defendant. 
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1 The record may show the defendant, in open court, 
2 has signed the Statement of the Defendant. 
3 The Court will add its signature as his and as a 
4 witness to the -- as a witness to his and respective counsel. 
5 Now, I think today is the 20th day of April, so I 
6 better change those dates. Let's see. The 20th there. 
7 MR. BIGGS: I put the wrong date, your Honor? 
8 THE COURT: You put the 24th, but I changed that. So 
9 it's obviously done in open court. 
10 All right. Now, then to the Information in case 
11 882, aggravated robbery, first-degree felony, how do you plead, 
12 guilty or not guilty? 
13 THE DEPENDANT: I pled guilty. 
14 THE COURT: All right. And count two is being 
15 dismissed, right? 
16 MS. WISSLER: That's correct, your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: All right. 
18 MS. WISSLER: That's the State's motion. 
19 THE COURT: Based on the plea in 882, the Court will 
20 dismiss the other cases, and they are 169 and 102. 
21 MR. BIOGS: And, your Honor, for the record, although 
22 we stated it before, Mr. Mora waives his right to the 
23 preparation of a presentence report and is requesting the Court 
24 to sentence him today. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. The Court accepts that waiver. 
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I have previously asked you -- let me just have you 
repeat --to this offense you plead guilty, is that correct, 
the aggravated robbery? 
THE DEPENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. I entered a plea of guilty. And 
there is a mandatory enhauicement, and the Court will add five 
years mandatory enhancement, so it will be -- it's actually six 
to life plus five-year mandatory enhancement. Right? 
MS. WISSLER: It is a six-to-life plus a 
zero-to-five, consecutive. 
THE COURT: Okay. That's what I will do. Six to 
life plus a zero to life consecutive, forthwith, Utah State 
Prison, $10,000 fine plus a surcharge, and you will be sent 
immediately to prison and they will do a post-sentence report 
for you. 
MR. BIGGS: Your Honor, one last thing. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. BIGGS: He has served 182 days and I would ask 
credit for that time. 
THE COURT: Giving credit for 182 days' time served. 
MR. BIGGS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Good luck to you, Mr. Mora. 
(Proceedings in the above-entitled matter were 
concluded.) 
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SIRENA M. WISSLER, Bar No. 7450 
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231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
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Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
GUSTAVOMORA, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE: 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
GUILTY PLEA 
Case No. 001917882 
Judge MICHAEL K. BURTON 
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, filed in the above-captioned matter, 
came before this Court for hearing in the above-entitled matter on October 24, 2001. 
Defendant was represented by counsel, Susanne Gustin-Furgis, and the State was 
represented by Sirena M. Wissler, Deputy District Attorney for Salt Lake County. The 
Court, having received and reviewed the transcript of the change of plea, and the 
memoranda submitted by each party, and having heard argument, hereby enters the 
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On October 11, 2000, Mitra Baral was robbed at gunpoint at the Econolodge 
located at 715 West North Temple. 
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2. Mitra Baral gave a description of the perpetrator to officers at the Salt Lake 
County Police Department. He told them the perpetrator was a Hispanic male, 
24-25 years old, 5 feet 5 inches tall, 160 pounds, with slicked back, medium 
length, black hair. He told them the man spoke English well with an accent, 
wore a long, black, expensive looking leather coat, possibly black pants and 
black boots. 
3. The Econolodge surveillance tape captured the defendant on video during the 
robbery. Mitra Baral gave the Salt Lake County Police Department the 
videotape. 
4. Mitra Baral later identified the defendant in a photo-lineup as the man who 
robbed him. 
5. Salt Lake City Police detective G. Allred also identified the defendant in the 
Econolodge surveillance video from a still photo. 
6. Defendant was ultimately charged with the instant case, Aggravated Robbery, 
a First Degree Felony, and Theft from a Person, a Second Degree Felony for 
the incident that occurred at the Econolodge on October 11, 2000. Defendant 
was notified that the State was seeking an enhanced penalty because a firearm 
had been used during commission of the robbery. 
7. Defendant was also charged with two other Aggravated Robberies, arising out 
of incidents unrelated to the October 11, 2000 Econolodge robbery. 
8. Following Preliminary Hearings held in each case, defendant was bound over 
to stand trial on all three of his Aggravated Robbery cases. 
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9. Defendant was, at the time of his arrest, a parole fugitive from California. 
The State of California had communicated that it wished to prosecute the 
defendant under its habitual offender or "three strikes" statute. 
10. The instant case was scheduled for trial on May 3, 4, and 8, 2001. A final pre-
trial conference was held on April 20, 2001. 
11. Prior to the final pre-trial conference, the State of Utah extended a plea 
bargain offer. The offer was that defendant could enter a guilty plea to an 
Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony, including the weapon 
enhancement. In exchange, the remaining charge (a theft from a person) in 
the instant case would be dismissed, as would defendant's other two 
Aggravated Robbery cases. 
12. The defendant appeared at the pre-trial conference before Judge David S. 
Young on April 20, 2001, and indicated a willingness to accept the State's 
plea bargain offer. The Court then began the process of explaining to 
defendant the rights he waived in entering a guilty plea. 
13. Defendant repeatedly interrupted Judge Young during the plea colloquy, and 
insisted that he be permitted to plead guilty and be sent to the prison that very 
same day. 
14. David Biggs, defendant's attorney, referred to a document, which he had filled 
out and reviewed with the defendant prior to the colloquy with the Court. 
That document, entitled Statement of Defendant, Certificate of Counsel and 
Order, was also referred to by Judge Young and is part of the record in the 
instant case. 
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15. At one point during the colloquy, Judge Young questioned the defendant's 
willingness to plead guilty, and indicated that perhaps the cases should go to 
trial 
16. The State's representative, who was also present at the pre-trial conference, 
indicated that the State was prepared to go forward with trial on May 3. 
17. Defendant indicated that he wanted to plead guilty, but insisted on being 
sentenced to prison that day. 
18. The Court ultimately accommodated the defendant's desire to have sentence 
imposed immediately after being assured by a representative of Adult 
Probation and Parole that a post-sentence report could be completed in lieu of 
a pre-sentence report. 
19. The defendant then informed the Court "I want to take it." 
20. During the plea colloquy, the defendant admitted that he took personal 
property from the victim and that he got the victim to give him the money by 
possessing a gun. The defendant acknowledged that conduct and indicated, "I 
plead guilty to that." 
21. The defendant was advised, both orally and as part of the Statement of 
Defendant, that he had a right to have a trial by an impartial jury on all of his 
cases, and was in fact reminded that one of his cases was set for trial 
beginning on May 3. The Statement of Defendant, which defendant executed 
in open court, included that the defendant's right to trial included the right to a 
speedy, public trial. 
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22. Defendant was also advised both orally and as part of the Statement of 
Defendant, that before he could be convicted, the jury would have to 
unanimously agree. As part of the Statement of Defendant, defendant 
acknowledged an understanding of the concept of reasonable doubt and that 
the State bears the burden of proving guilt to that high standard. 
23. Defendant was advised both orally and as part of the Statement of Defendant 
that the State would be required to call witnesses in an effort to convict him, 
and that he had the right to cross examine those witnesses with the assistance 
of his attorney. 
24. Defendant was advised both orally and as part of the Statement of Defendant 
that he had the right to compel witnesses to testify on his behalf. The 
Statement of Defendant further indicated that if the defendant could not afford 
to subpoena witnesses, the State would bear the cost of subpoena. 
25. Defendant was advised both orally and as part of the Statement of Defendant 
that at trial, he had the right to testify on his own behalf, but he also had the 
right to remain silent. He was advised both orally and as part of the Statement 
of Defendant that if he exercised his right to remain silent, no presumption as 
to his guilt could be drawn by his silence. 
26. Defendant was advised both orally and as part of the Statement of Defendant 
as to the penalty for Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony, and as to the 
effect of the weapons enhancement to which he also entered a guilty plea. 
The defendant acknowledged several times that he understood the penalty for 
the both the offense itself and the enhancement. 
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27. Defendant was advised both orally and as part of the Statement of Defendant 
that by pleading guilty he waived his rights associated with appeal, the trial 
court indicating, "the appeals court can't review a trial that doesn't happen." 
Defendant acknowledged the waiver by stating "I know that." 
28. Defendant was advised, both orally and as part of the Statement of Defendant, 
that he had 30 days from the date of entry of the plea (which was the same day 
defendant was sentenced) to withdraw his plea for good cause shown. 
29. Defendant was asked whether he was satisfied with the advice his attorney 
had given him. He indicated that he was indeed satisfied. 
30. Defendant was asked whether he had any questions of the Court or counsel. 
He indicated that he had no questions. 
31. Defendant and the Court engaged in extensive discussion about the fact that 
he anticipated being extradited to and prosecuted in the State of California. 
Both his attorney David Biggs and the Court advised the defendant that no 
one could guarantee him what the State of California was going to do with 
him. 
32. Defendant was advised that he could be required to serve time in California 
after he was finished serving his time in Utah. The Statement of Defendant 
also addressed the concept of concurrent as opposed to consecutive sentences. 
33. Defendant was also advised that the Court could not assure him that he would 
not be prosecuted federally on gjin charges. 
34. Defendant participated in all phases of the colloquy. He asked questions and 
was responsive to questions asked of him. He repeatedly indicated that he 
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understood the plea bargain, the various rights he was waiving by entering it, 
and the penalty involved. 
35. Defendant acknowledged as part of the Statement of Defendant that he could 
read and understand English, that he had read the Statement of Defendant and 
acknowledged the truth of its contents, and that he was not under the influence 
of anything that would impair his judgment. He further indicated as part of 
that Statement of defendant that no undue influence, threats, coercion or 
inducements were brought to bear upon him to cause him to enter a guilty 
plea. 
36. After the colloquy, defendant was unshackled for purposes of signing the 
Statement of Defendant, which he signed in open court. The Court added its 
signature, and asked the defendant how he pled to Aggravated Robbery, a 
First Degree felony. The defendant answered, "I plead guilty." 
37. In exchange for his guilty plea to Aggravated Robbery in case no. 001917882, 
count two in that case and cases 001918102 and 001918169, both of which 
were Aggravated Robberies, were dismissed, 
38. Defendant waived the preparation of a pre-sentence report and the statutory 
minimum time for sentencing, asking to be sentenced immediately. 
39. The Court accommodated the defendant's desire, and sentenced him to an 
indeterminate term of 6 years to life, plus an additional 0-5 years for the 
discretionary weapon enhancement, to run consecutively to the 6 to life. 
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40. Defendant then timely wrote a letter to David Biggs, indicating his desire to 
"appeal." Conflict counsel was appointed in the person of Susanne Gustin-
Furgis, who filed a Motion to Withdraw Plea. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The defendant was properly apprised of all of his constitutional rights, and 
that he waived those rights by entering a guilty plea. During the colloquy, the 
trial judge substantially complied with the requirements of Utah Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 11, and supplemented the oral colloquy with a written 
Statement of Defendant, Certificate of Counsel and Order. Taken together, 
the oral colloquy and the written Statement of Defendant contain a complete 
recitation of the defendant's constitutional rights. 
2. Defendant was fully and appropriately advised of the penalties associated with 
Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree felony, including the effect of the 
weapons enhancement. 
3. Despite defendant's contention to the contrary, no promises were made to him 
as an inducement to enter a guilty plea, other than the plea bargain discussed 
in open court. Defendant's claim that promises were made to him relative to 
his parole status in California finds no support in the record. To the contrary, 
the Court was careful to advise him that neither it nor defense counsel could 
guarantee that any sentence imposed in California would run concurrently. In 
addition, the defendant was properly cautioned that it was not up to the Court, 
nor defense counsel, to decide how long he would serve in Utah before he 
could go to California to be prosecuted in that state. 
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4. The defendant's admission to taking personal property from the victim by use 
of a gun is a sufficient factual basis for acceptance of a guilty plea to 
aggravated robbery, with a weapon enhancement. 
5. Defendant's demeanor in court, together with his involved dialogue with the 
court and his signature acknowledging the truthfulness of the contents of the 
Statement of Defendant evidenced a knowing and voluntary waiver of his 
constitutional rights and guilty plea. 
6. At the time defendant entered a guilty plea to Aggravated Robbery, a First 
Degree Felony, with a weapons enhancement, he did so with full knowledge 
of the consequences of that plea, and of the elements of the offense. 
DATED this [±_ day of November, 2001. 
Read and approved as to form by: 
SUSANNE GUSTIN-FURGIS 
Attorney for Defendant 
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